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LIABILITY IN TORT
TORT-Products Liability-Oklahoma's Emergence
from Antiquity, Acceptance of The Doctrine of Strict
Liability in Tort
In the case of Barnhart v. Freeman Equipment Company,-
plaintiff was an employee of Consumers Co-operative in Enid,
Oklahoma. Consumers Coop. purchased a number of truck-
tractors from defendant, all of which had defective tierods.
International Harvester, the assembler of the tractors, noti-
fied Rockwell Standard Corporation, manufacturer of the
tierod and co-defendant. Rockwell designed a replacement
part and forwarded it to Freeman, defendant, for immediate
installation. Following installation of the new part on approxi-
mately one-half of Consumers' trucks, it was discovered that
the new tierod was unsatisfactory. Freeman remodified some
of the trucks which had already undergone modification, but
failed to correct plaintiff's Unit 465. Because of the defect,
plaintiff was involved in an accident and was severely in-
jured. The District Court dismissed the action against de-
fendants. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding
Rockwell, manufacturer of the defective product, strictly lia-
ble in tort and Freeman liable in negligence. A separate ac-
tion was brought against the assembler, International Har-
vester.
The law has markedly progressed since Winterbottom v.
Wright,2 in 1842, where the Court affirmed the requirement
of privity of contract even in a negligence or tort case. Since
1916,3 the assault upon the citadel of privity has most as-
suredly proceeded space. The renunciation of the doctrine of
privity where a product due to its negligent construction is
dangerous to life and limb4 opened a door to recovery which
I Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 411 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1968).
2 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916).
4 Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1055.
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has yet to be fully developed. The theory of negligence super-
seding that of privity gradually became recognized as the
law in Oklahoma.5 However, due to social pressures demand-
ing greater protection of the public from personal injury there
also evolved a doctrine based entirely on public policy. Thus,
the concept of strict liability in tort was conceived. This doc-
trine was initiated in Oklahoma in the food cases,6 and then
cautiously extended to include those articles for intimate
bodily use.7 However, until 19658, the law governing products
liability, other than goods for consumption or bodily use, was
in somewhat of a state of limbo. It suffered the unsuspecting
plaintiff to satisfy certain warranty requirements, e.g., privity
and notice, or prove negligent conduct if he was to recover.9
In 1965, the Oklahoma Supreme Court following the ra-
5 Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F..2d 673 (10th Cir.), cert.
dnied 360 U.S. 900 (1959); Bower v. Corbell, 408 P.2d 307
(Okla. 1965); Gosnell v Zink, 325 P2d 965 (Okla. 1958);
Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934).
Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 900 (1959);
1958); Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934).
6 Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P.2d 375, 376 (Okla.
1958) held that, "[W]here a dealer sells food for immedi-
ate human consumption, purchaser may rely on implied
warranty that such food is wholesome and not deleterious,
and in the event he sustains injury from the consumption
thereof he may maintain his cause of action upon such im-
plied warranty." Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. New-
ton, 205 Okla. 360, 237 P.2d 627 (1951) (beverage); South-
west Ice & Dairy Prods. Co. v. Fawlkenberry, 203 Okla.
279, 220 P.2d 257 (1950) (milk); Griffin v. Asbury, 196
Okla. 484, 165 P.2d 822 (1945) (beverage).
7 Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1968); John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259 (Okla.
1963) (hair spray).
8 Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla.
1965).
9 McAlester Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lynch, 280 P.2d 466
(Okla. 1955).
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tionale of a line of California Cases,10 held that where a con-
sumer is injured by a defective battery: "The manufactur-
er's liability was established when it was shown that the
plaintiff was injured while using the battery for the pur-
pose intended by reason of defect as to which he was not
aware, and could not have ascertained by examination.""
The impact of Marathon on Oklahoma law was somewhat
dubious. The occurence of the accident in Marathon was prior
to the adoption of the Commercial Code.1'2 Therefore, certain
seemingly common areas, such as effect of disclaimers, 3 and
what parties may benefit,'14 remained uncertain. However, as
noted in Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newson,15 the rule set forth
in Marathon was not changed by the Commercial Code. Rath-
er, the Court recognized the Marathon rule to be in accord
with the Code's concept of implied warranty and merchant-
ability.16 Thus, the law in Oklahoma which may be extracted
from the Commercial Code and judicial decisions is that
which is expounded in the Restatement.1'7 While as yet in its
infant stage, it promises room for growth and expansion as
evidenced in Barnhart.8
The importance of the Barnhart case is twofold. It reaf-
10 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61
Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 914,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) held that, "A manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
a human being."
"Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, at 915.
12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-101 (1961).
13 Id. § 2-316.
14 Id. § 2-318.
15 Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newson, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.
1967).
16 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-314 (1961).
17 RESTATEMENT (SEco1N) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
18 Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 441 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1968).
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firms the Supreme Court's position as set forth in Marathon,
and extends the class of those liable to a manufacturer of
component parts.19 In addition, it may be suggested that the
Court, while addressing itself to the negligence of the retailer-
repairman and adopting the Restatement view,20 is nonethe-
less equating this negligence to a defect and in effect apply-
ing a strict liability. This liability, both Rockwell's and Free-
man's, affirmed in Barnhart and noted by Justice Traynor,23
is not one based on negligence or privity but on the con-
cept of strict liability in tort;24 liability whose effect is to
shoulder the manufacturer with the burden of placing a non-
defective product on the market.
Now that Oklahoma has embraced the dictates of public
policy and recognized strict liability in tort, what may be
gleaned from the Marathon case? Looking again to the su-
preme court's explanation in Marathon, 25 it bcomes apparent
that the manufacturer's liability while strict is not absolute.
The plaintiff must show that he was using the product for
the purpose for which it was intended, i.e., that contemplated
by reasonable parties, and that his injury was the result of
defect. What might constitute a defect is a subject capable
of unlimited hypothesis. However, it appears to be at least
the breach of a warranty of fitness and merchantability, 20 or
a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him.27 As a further limita-
19 Id. at 1000.
20 Id. at 998; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 (1965).
21 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
22 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, com-
ment m at 355 (1965).
25 418 P.2d at 900.
24 Schenfeld v. Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968).
25 Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla.
1965).
26 3 L. FRumER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIBIITY §
3-16A(4), at 3-202 (1967).
27 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, com-
ment g at 351 (1965).
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tion or requirement, the Court suggests that to maintain his
action, plaintiff must not have been aware of the defect nor
have been able to discover it by a reasonable inspection. The
former requirement infers that if plaintiff was aware of the
defect then he proceeded unreasonably, and will be denied
recovery because he assumed the risk. While Oklahoma has
yet to address itself to this problem, the view above is con-
sistent with the Restatement.28 The heretofore mentioned
requirement of examination pertains primarily to patent de-
fects, requiring only a reasonable examination. It is sug-
gested that the Court did not intend to make the purchaser
accountable for defects which are of a remote or latent na-
ture, for this would seem to defeat the public policy dictates
which form the roots of strict liability in tort. In essence,
the question faced by courts in applying the products liability
doctrine is what doctrine will replace the requirement of
fault or contract as a means of delimiting liability. The chief
limitation heretofore accepted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court is the requirement that the product be defective for
the use intended.
The application of strict liability in the field of products
liability is still in its infant stage. Oklahoma has recognized
that the manufacturer of the whole,29 the manufacturer of
components and a repairman fall into that class of defendants
whose duty to the public brings them within the jurisdiction
of the doctrine.30 However, in negligence cases Oklahoma
courts have previously held that recovery can be maintain-
ed against almost any seller in the commercial chain. 1 While
yet undecided as to strict liability with respect to retailer
and wholesaler, it seems inevitable that Oklahoma will adopt
the same position as announced by Vandermark, 2 Prosser,33
28 Id. comment n at 356.
29 Case cited, note 8 supra.
30 Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 441 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1968).
81 Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P.2d 375, 376 (Okla. 1958).
82 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 259, 391 P.2d
168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964) which held that,
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and the Restatement.3 4 This position would hold all members
of the commercial chain to the duty of a reasonable inspec-
tion of the product, except where the products are not con-
ducive to inspection for defects, e.g., come from the manu-
facturer in sealed containers. In the latter instance, the pur-
chaser always has an action for breach of the implied war-
ranty of fitness.35
Another problem exists as to who is protected and for
what damages may he seek recovery. Prior decisions in Okla-
homa indicate that in addition to the remote purchaser and
members of his household, an employee who stands in the
shoes of his employer may also recover It seems likely that
public policy will extend this concept to include all of those
persons whose presence and use of the product could have been
foreseen. This is the policy set forth in the Restatement,3 0
though it is limited in warranty cases by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.0 7 However, notice that the mere bystander is
purposely absent from Restatement consideration and has not
been considered as belonging to that class of foreseeable
persons. If this step is taken it would mark the final fall
of the citadel.
The concept of strict liability is an outgrowth of the pub-
lic concern for protecting the individual from bodily harm.
"Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business
of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral
part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products."
83 Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1101
(1960).
84 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, com-
ment f at 350 (1965).
35 John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259, 266 (Okla.
1963).
36 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, com-
ment I at 354 (1965).
87 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1961).
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Thus, as set forth by numerous cases and authorities, per-
sonal injury to all exept the mere bystander is always com-
pensable. However, what about damage to one's property?
While Oklahoma has yet to extend the principle this far, in
the language of Chief Justice Traynor and Prosser, "Physical
injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is
no reason for distinguishing them.138 This proposes an ex-
tension of recoverable losses. Although the New Jersey Court 39
has allowed recovery for a purely economic loss, e.g., loss of
value of a defective carpet, Chief Justice Traynor strongly
rebutts this position,40 saying such recovery should be limit-
ed to a warranty action and is beyond the purpose of the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. Therefore, it seems that
where one suffers injury due to a defective product he may
recover damages which were the result of that defect; but,
where his loss is purely economic he must bring his action
for breach of warranty.
Products liability in Oklahoma is a ripening field yet to
be harvested. Strict liability in tort is not meant to be a re-
placement or substitute for breach of warranty or negligence.
Likewise, it does not seek to impose an absolute liability on
those in the commercial chain but provides certain prereq-
uisites, i.e., normal use, use without knowledge of the defect,
and reasonable examination. The Barnhart case may be said
to be the cornerstone of Oklahoma law in the area of prod-
ucts liability. The effect of this law is to provide the public
with the ultimate protection possible against defects dang-
erous to life and limb. The manufacturer has an absolute de-
fense: he can insure himself against liability by placing a
non-defective product on the market.
Tom R. Gann
38 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 916, 403 P2d 145, 152,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965); Prosser, Assault upon the Cita-
del, supra note 33, at 1143.
39 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965).
40 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 149,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21.
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